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Abstract 
 Historians and military officials often consider the National Guard as the direct 
descendent of the colonial militia, and the transition between the two is described as natural.  
However, the Guard was not the only option available to replace the militia, and many 
Washington officials and prominent civilians supported European style replacements based 
on universal military training for all able bodied men.  The National Guard maintained a 
successful lobby and Congress redefined and solidified the new National Guard system with 
a series of laws during the first two decades of the twentieth century.  However, detractors 
continued to attack the new system and the Guard needed to prove its value.  Mexican border 
duty and service in the First World War provided the Guard with this opportunity.  The 
training the Guard received at the border provided the Guard with the skills necessary to 
perform in the trenches in France, and the Guard performed better than anticipated.  The 
border duty proved vital for the overall survival of the Guard and it allowed the Guard to 
provide a quickly mobilized and highly trained force to aid in the American war effort.     
1 
 
Introduction 
After marching over 166 miles though intense heat and a hurricane, troops from 
numerous states’ National Guards stood proud of their achievement.1  One might expect this 
was the result of some great battle, but such was not the case.  Instead this was a scene at 
New Braunfels, Texas in 1917 during a training exercise near the Mexican border.   In 1916, 
President Woodrow Wilson activated the National Guards of every state for Mexican border 
service after years of hostile relations with Mexico and a failed expedition to capture Pancho 
Villa.  The Guard’s mission was simple: to protect the border from bandits such as Villa.  
Yet, the day to day lives of these troops did not reflect their original mission.  While 
government mobilized the troops to protect against further Mexican incursions into the 
nation, they seem instead to have participated in an unplanned mass training exercise for a 
greater war.   
The troops at the border received weapons training, performed marching drills, 
participated in simulated battles, and the troops received valuable camp life experience.
2
  
This training allowed the Guard to prepare for massive movements and military actions 
which proved vital for the Guard’s performance in the First World War.  Existing histories of 
the National Guard mention the border duty in passing, and consider it a small part of a much 
larger narrative. Troy Ainsworth published, “Boredom, Fatigue, Illness and Death: The 
United States National Guard and the Texas-Mexico Border, 1916-1917.”  Yet, Ainsworth 
makes little mention of missions or how the troops spent their leisure time.  Instead, 
                                                          
1
 Col. Moses Thisted, With the Wisconsin National Guard on the Mexican Border, 1916-1917 (Milwaukee: 
Milwaukee Journal, 1917) 78-9. 
2
 Cpt. Irving G. McCann, With the National Guard on the Border: Our National Military Problem (St. Louis: C.V. 
Mosby Company, 1917). This memoir of border duty outlined the day to day activities of the 1
st
 Illinois Infantry 
on the Mexican border.  Captain McCann detailed the training he and his brigade received at the border. 
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Ainsworth argues that the border duty was in essence a failure and only served to train the 
troops.
3
  He does not account for or mention the long-term survival of the National Guard.  
The training at the border was directly tied to the long-term survival of the guard because it 
prepared the troops for wartime service, and those who did not immediately go overseas 
provided valuable guidance for raw recruits into the Guard. Ultimately, this training provided 
the National Guard with the skills necessary to fight alongside the regular army in Europe.  
The Guard performed better than expected in Europe, and service in the Great War helped to 
ensure the Guard’s survival as a piece of the American military system. 
In 1916 the United States Army was undergoing a modernization and reorganization 
process which eventually prepared it for the trials and necessities of modern warfare, and the 
National Guard was no exception.  The United States maintained a state-controlled militia 
force since its founding, but that system proved itself inefficient by the turn of the twentieth 
century.
4
 The U.S. government took steps to reform the militia and the National Guard’s 
existence was not a foregone conclusion, as political leaders proposed numerous plans based 
on universal military training (UMT), a system in which all men of military age would 
receive some amount of military training and could be activated for service at any time.
5
  
Even as late as May 1916, 800 of the 970 commercial organizations holding membership in 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce voted in favor of UMT.  The prevailing notion was that a 
volunteer force consisting of “amateurs” could not adequately compliment the regular army.6  
In many ways though, the National Guard system of the twentieth century was a new system 
                                                          
3
 Troy Ainsworth, “Boredom, Fatigue, Illness and Death: The United States National Guard and the Texas-
Mexico Border, 1916-1917,” The Journal of Big Bend Studies 19 (2007): 95-6. 
4
 Charles Sydney Clark, “The Future of the National Guard,” The North American Review 170 (1900) 732-3. 
5
 “Senate Debates the Militia,” The New York Times, January 16, 1902. 
6
 “Defense Sentiment Shown by Poll of Businessmen,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, May 26, 1916. 
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as well.  While the name, “National Guard” survived the transition from the old militia 
system, the new Guard was a replacement of the militia.  The Militia Acts of 1903 and 1908 
and the National Defense Act of 1916 established and solidified the Guard system, but the 
National Guard needed to prove itself.  Indeed, many guardsmen, politicians, and civilians 
were unsure as to what role, if any, the Guard would play in the twentieth century American 
military.   
  When a large defensive force was needed at the Mexican border, the Guard was the 
only military element at the president’s disposal with sufficient numbers for this task.  The 
border service provided the Guard system with its first opportunity to prove itself, and World 
War I provided its second.  Eventually, advocates of the Guard responded that World War I 
had proven the importance of having a large, trained force ready for quick mobilization; 
therefore, officials in both state and the federal government decided not only to retain the 
Guard system, but to strengthen and solidify its position in the post-war American military 
system.   
The American military system of World War I consisted of the regular army, the 
National Guard, and drafted troops.  And while the National Guard made up only one piece 
of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), it served a dual role as a combat force and a 
reserve force.
7
  The actions and service of Iowa and Illinois guardsmen during the World 
War I period offer a prism through which to view the Guard system of the early twentieth 
century.  A key aspect of the National Guard is its connection to state governments; 
therefore, the experiences and expectations of Iowa and Illinois guardsmen may differ than 
                                                          
7
 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968) 61-3. The AEF consisted of three main parts: the regular army, the National 
Guard, and drafted troops 
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those of other states, but the Guards of the upper Midwest are representative of the greater 
Guard in a general sense, as their personal experiences epitomize the Guard’s role at the 
border and in France.  Further, the Guards of Illinois and Iowa represent a fairly large portion 
of the American population (Illinois was the third largest state in the nation in 1910) and 
made up roughly ten percent of the entire force at the Mexican border.
8
  Essentially, by 
examining these two states’ Guards, one can gain an appreciation and an understanding of 
the state of the organization before, during, and immediately after World War I.      
While the National Guard has existed in its current form, with some minor changes, 
throughout most of the twentieth century, numerous misperceptions regarding the National 
Guard exist today, and those same misconceptions existed just prior to World War I.  During 
the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, mobilization of the Guard was met with some 
criticism, as many felt the Guard’s role was to serve as a state relief organization and a 
defensive force on the home-front.  In fact though, there was a long-standing historical 
precedent for the use of the Guard in international conflicts.  Prior to 1916 and 1917, the 
Guard’s role in the American military system was somewhat confusing and vague, but the 
National Defense Act of 1916 as well as the massive mobilization for the Great War 
established the Guard as not only a reserve force, but also a key component of the American 
Army.   The Guard’s action during the First World War period helped to ensure its future, 
and the Iowa and Illinois Guards are part of the larger story.   
                                                          
8
 U.S. Census Bureau, Thirteenth Census of the United States: Taken in the Year 1910  (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1913) 21-3.  The 1910 census, released in 1913 declared that Illinois had 995, 198 
citizens in 1910, third in the nation behind New York and Pennsylvania, and, “Gov. Dunne Mobilizes Illinois’ 
8,000 Guards at Night Conference.”  Chicago Daily Tribune, 19 June 1916, and Louis Lasher, Adjutant General, 
Report of the Adjutant General of Iowa: For the Biennial Period Ended June 30, 1918 (Des Moines: State of 
Iowa Printing Press, 1919) 43.  The combined number of the 8,000 Illinois troops sent to the border and the 
4,300 Iowa troops amounts to roughly 12,300 of the roughly 120,000 Guardsmen at the border. 
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Historiography 
Numerous historians have studied the American military and American society during 
World War I.  Of course, many historians have included the National Guard in their studies 
of the AEF and of American military actions in Europe, yet most of these works only include 
the Guard as a small part of the larger narrative.
9
  Many other historians have focused on the 
entire history of the National Guard.
10
  Therefore, the historiography of the American 
military during World War I is much larger than Guard historiography and often includes 
minor mentions of the Guard, whereas the historiography of the Guard often mentions World 
War I as a small part of a larger narrative.   
The historiography of World War I is incredibly vast.  People directly involved in the 
conflict wrote many early histories of the war, and professional scholarship on the American 
experience of World War I began during the 1930s.  Frederick Paxson’s America at War: 
1917-1918 served as the standard history of America during the war for decades.  This work 
summarized the political, social, economic, military, and diplomatic history of the United 
States during belligerency.  Paxson’s work also served another purpose, as he placed the 
American military in the larger narrative of the war, and explained how America emerged as 
a world power.
11
  
                                                          
9
 Coffman, The War to End All Wars, Chapters III and V explicitly detail the formation of the AEF and only 
mention the Guard in passing.  Major mentions of the guard are noted when Coffman examined the National 
Defense Act of 1916.  Similarly, John S. Eisenhower with Joanne Thompson Eisenhower, Yanks: The Epic Story 
of the American Army in World War I (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 23. This work also examined the 
American Army of World War I, but the Guard is majorly mentioned as a small portion of that army and is only 
noted distinctively when the National Defense Act of 1916 was detailed. 
10
 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1983) and Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and war: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg: The 
Stackpole Company, 1964) and Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 
1636-2000 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).   
11
 Frederic L. Paxson, American Democracy and the World War, vol. II, America At War (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1936) 7, 11-13. 
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After the Second World War, a new wave of scholarship on World War I emerged.  
Many studies which focused on the political and diplomatic aspects of the war emerged in 
the 1950s.
12
  This once again shifted during the 1960s, when scholars began to re-examine 
the American military in the greater context of the war.  Edward Coffman wrote The War to 
End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I during a shift in the 
emphasis of military history, and he examines the development and deployment of the AEF.  
Coffman attempted to expand his work beyond the “old” style of military history, such as 
Eye Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I by John Ellis, which focused on the 
strategies and tactics of the armies on the Western Front.
13
  By looking at many aspects of the 
war, Coffman expressed the complexities of the greater wartime experience.    
Coffman’s work fit into what had become the standard style of military history after 
the 1960’s.  By focusing on the social and cultural aspects of warfare, historians placed 
military actions in the context of social development.  David M. Kennedy specifically placed 
World War I in the context of American development in his 1980 work, Over Here: The 
First World War and American Society.  While this work does include some military aspects, 
the focus was not on American military actions.  Rather, Kennedy examined the American 
home-front and the social, political, cultural, and economic realities during the war.  Writing 
less than a decade after the Vietnam War, which had caused a great level of social unrest in 
the United States, Kennedy looked at the divisive nature of the World War I and the cultural 
and social rifts the war created. 
14
 
                                                          
12
 Coffman, War, 388. 
13
 John Ellis, Eye Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976) 
14
 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society 25
th
 Anniversary Edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1980, 2004) 371.   
7 
 
Social and political histories of the World War I period also examine the development 
of the AEF and the lives of American troops overseas.  John Chambers released To Raise an 
Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America in 1987, where he examined the draft system 
which emerged after the Selective Service Act of 1916.
15
  Recent studies have re-examined 
the wartime experience of the American military.  Robert Zieger, for example, adds new 
elements to an old discussion when he explored race, class, and gender during American 
belligerency, and his work tied the American experience during the war directly to the ideas 
and principles of the Progressive Era.
16
  Jennifer Keene examines the American doughboy in 
the Great War, but her focus on the National Guard regarded struggles with the federal 
government, and she particularly noted the army’s condescension toward the Guard.17  These 
works, among others, placed military and economic developments of the war in a broader 
ideological context.
18
 
The historiography of World War I is certainly much larger than that of the Guard, 
but the historiography of the National Guard is extensive.  However, most studies of the 
Guard are focused either on the larger narrative of the Guard’s activities or are regimental 
                                                          
15
 John Chambers, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free Press, 1987). 
16
 Robert H. Zieger, America’s Great War: World War I and the American Experience (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000) 1-3. 
17
 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001) 16-9. 
18
 John S. Eisenhower, Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I (New York: The Free Press, 
2001) and John S. Eisenhower, Intervention: The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917 (New 
York: W.W. Norton Co., 1993).  These two recent studies examined this time period.  Eisenhower also 
examined the situation between the United States and Mexico and ended with the Punitive Expedition to 
capture villa.  However, the National Guard received only marginal mention in these two works.  Similarly, 
much has been written about the expedition to capture Villa; however, little has been written primarily about 
the National Guard’s border duty.  An early example is, Louis Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican 
Revolution, 1913-1916 (New York: Exposition Press, 1967), which gives extensive details about the events 
which led to Pancho Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico and General Pershing’s expedition to capture Villa.  
Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York: 
MacMillan Co., 1969).  However, unlike Teitelbaum and many authors after, Clendenen does dedicate an 
entire chapter to the National Guard at the border.   
8 
 
histories, such as James Cooke’s The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919, which 
examined the actions of the 42
nd
 Infantry Division during American belligerency.
19
  Some 
historians, such as Eleanor Hannah, have studied the social perceptions and realities of Guard 
troops rather than the military aspects during the Gilded Age.  Hannah argues that many men 
valued militia and later Guard duty as patriotic and masculine identities.
20
  She points out that 
during the late nineteenth century industrialization blurred the definition of masculinity and 
post-war freedom, while mass immigration obscured the meaning of citizenship.
21
 
Other historians such as John K. Mahon and Jim Dan Hill broadly examined the 
history of the National Guard, but consider the World War I period as only a step in the 
Guard’s evolution.22  Conversely, Jerry Cooper examines the relatively short period between 
1865 and 1920, by specifically focusing on the power struggle between the federal 
government and state governments.
23
  In 2008, Barry Stentiford published “The Meaning of a 
Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia,” which detailed the 
mentality of guardsmen during a time of transition.  According to Stentiford, this transition 
severed the direct ties Guard troops had to their community, while expanding their ties to the 
nation.  Yet, the old hopes and expectations of a local military organization directly tied to a 
                                                          
19
 James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport: Praeger, 1994). 
20
Eleanor Hannah, Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard: Illinois 1870-1916 (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2007) 1-2. 
21
Hannah, Manhood, 231-216., and Eleanor Hannah, “From the Dance Floor to the Rifle Range: The Evolution 
of Manliness in the National Guards, 1870-1917,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 6.2, (2007) 
176-7. 
22
 Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard and Hill, Minute Man. (See note 9). 
23
 Jerry Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1997) xiii and xvi. 
9 
 
community persisted.
24
  A vast literature deals with the Guard, World War I, or the situation 
with Mexico; however, few tie the three together in any detail.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
Barry Stentiford, “The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia,” 
The Journal of Military History 72 (2008): 728-730.  
10 
 
Existing Notions of the Guard 
After the Civil War, men from all walks of life who were fulfilling what they 
considered their patriotic duty comprised the militia.  When militia units needed men and 
money to continue from year to year, parades and patriotic displays placed local militias at 
the forefront of common imagination, and became a major factor in attracting men of 
military age to militia service.  Because of the local nature of these units, they were 
representative of the class system in the community which furnished the unit.
25
  The Guard 
also reflected racial aspects of communities, but throughout the First World War Guard units 
remained segregated; although, the Guard provided eight of the twelve black units who 
eventually served overseas during World War I, including the Eighth Illinois.
26
  The 
relatively high proportion of African American troops in the Guard versus the regular army 
demonstrates how the Guard’s nature also appealed to minorities who hoped to establish 
themselves as equal citizens in their communities.
27
  The public nature of the militia drew 
growing numbers of men to their ranks during the last decades of the nineteenth century, and 
as the militia gave way to the National Guard, this spirit of patriotism and civic duty 
persisted.
28
   
Patriotism was not the only sense of duty that drew men to service in local militia 
units.  For many volunteers, the militia and later the Guard offered men a way to prove their 
                                                          
25
 Hannah, Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard, 33-5  Hannah’s work was based on the Illinois 
National Guard and militia, but her focus on class distinction within the Guard also appeals to studies of other 
states. 
26
 Kennedy, Over Here, 159 and Zieger, America’s Great War, 103.  It should be noted that Fort Des Moines 
was the official Officer Training Center for the small amount of black troops who gained commissions 
throughout the war. 
27
 Hannah, Manhood, 33-6.  Hannah notes that in the 1870s, African Americans began forming militia units, 
which tied to ideas of citizenship and masculinity. Therefore, the Guard appealed to minorities seeking 
equality in the eyes of their neighbors in the same way it appealed to native-born Americans. 
28
 Hannah, Manhood, 58-9. 
11 
 
masculinity, because public displays allowed the troops to put their manhood on display for 
the larger community.
29
  As the militia system declined and the National Guard system rose, 
the public parades and displays which were popular immediately after the Civil War 
diminished.  A 1915 article declared, “the public should bear in mind that the National Guard 
is no longer a social institution, upon whose dandified uniforms, which were anything but 
practical, money was lavished, and which devoted its time to acquiring proficiency in fancy 
drills and evolutions that made a pretty display at times of public ceremony, but had little 
connection with the stern duties of a real soldier.”30  The author then noted that the Guard 
was becoming a practical fighting force which encouraged marksmanship and military 
discipline, but remained a part-time commitment.  
In many ways, the Guard offered men an arena in which to prove their masculinity 
while not having to live the life of a regular soldier.  Therefore, that sense of masculinity and 
patriotism shifted away from public events toward proof of ability, often displayed within the 
unit itself.  This was evident during marksmanship competitions and other training routines, 
which offered troops a way to display their “manliness” to their fellow troops.31  Further, 
ideas of Futurism permeated the minds of young men in the first decades of the twentieth 
century.  F.T. Martinetti called to all “living men of the earth” to glorify the love of danger 
and glorify war, “the only true hygiene of the world.”32  While this was generally a European 
movement, young American men lived in the same industrial world, and sought the 
adventure associated with warfare.  The Guard provided this avenue without forcing men to 
                                                          
29
 Hannah, Manhood, 59. 
30
 Wilbur F. Sadler Jr., “Efficiency in the National Guard,” The North American Review 202 (1915) 545. 
31
 Sadler, “Efficiency,” 103-5. and Stentiford, “Meaning of a Name,” 728-30. 
32
 Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism,” (1908, published 1909) Originally 
published in Le Figaro (Paris) (20 February 1909). First English translation from Poesia (April-June 1909). 
12 
 
make a fulltime military commitment.  Yet, the National Guard also appealed to tradition and 
allowed men to pursue their civic duty while maintaining close ties to their community. 
The National Guard is arguably the oldest American military organization, having its 
origins in the colonial militia system.
33
  Prior to the militia reform acts of the early twentieth 
century militia mobilization for service in the U.S. Army was determined by the raising of 
volunteers specifically for army service or was at the discretion of the state governors.  This 
system transformed into the National Guard system between roughly 1870 and 1903.  During 
this time, the federal government increased funding to the state militias, and had more impact 
on the militia’s training and standards of uniformity.34  However, this was not an immediate 
or official transition, as some states adopted the term “National Guard” before it became 
official practice, such as the Iowa State Militia which was re-designated as the Iowa National 
Guard in 1877.  This was done in an effort to break the embarrassing connection the term 
“militia” had with drunkenness and inefficiency which the decades immediately following 
the Civil War produced.
35
  Yet, simply changing the name from the militia to the National 
Guard did not redeem its public perception.  The Spanish-American War demonstrated the 
Guard’s poor state of readiness.36  Only after Congress passed the Militia Act of 1903 
(commonly referred to as the Dick Act for Congressman Charles F. Dick, who was also a 
general in the National Guard), did the National Guard transform into an effective reserve 
                                                          
33
 Nationalguard.com/what-is-the-guard. 
34
 Stentiford, “Name,” 729. 
35
 Stentiford, 741. 
36
 William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington 
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957) 69. 
13 
 
force for the nation.
37
  This transition was not an easy one though, and the first decade and a 
half of the twentieth century proved to be significant for the National Guard. 
Questions arose by 1900 about the future state of the National Guard and whether or 
not it would play a role in the twentieth century American military.  In a 1900 article, Charles 
Sydney Clarke proposed that the Guard should be eliminated and all civil associations “who 
supported the Guard too much” should also be abolished.38  According to Clark, Guard 
deficiencies ranged from poor officer training to power struggles stemming from state 
control.
39
  Opponents of the Guard began proposing alternatives plans based on UMT, and 
varied in execution.  One proposal called for the expansion of the regular army, and each 
state would receive two regiments of regulars who would carry out the Guard’s role during 
peacetime.
40
  However, the most notable and advocated proposal was the “continental army 
plan,” which involved the creation of a federal force of all able bodied men between the ages 
of 18 and 45, and this proposal was still alive just prior to the passage of the National 
Defense Act in 1916.
41
  These alternatives were based on European models and required the 
federal government to take control of the militia, with the states “borrowing” militia troops in 
times of emergency.
42
  These plans gained steam based on misperceptions regarding the 
                                                          
37
 U.S. Congress, Militia Act of 1903: An Act to Promote the efficiency of the militia and for other purposes 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904) section 1 and Stentiford, 740.  
38
 Clark, “Future of the National Guard,” 734-5. 
39
 Clark, “Future,” 732-3. 
40
 W. Davies, “A Substitute for the National Guard,” The New York Times, February 2, 1902. 
41
 “The Militia Question,” The New York Times, February 7, 1916. 
42
 John F. O’Ryan, “The Role of the National Guard,” The North American Review 202 (1915) 364 and 370-2. 
14 
 
existing militia.
43
  Misperceptions aside, the inefficiencies and poor perception of the Guard 
gave its opponents political ammunition.  
The National Guard maintained a strong Washington lobby in the form of the 
National Guard Association (NGA); yet, the Congressional actions which saved the Guard in 
essence created a new military force.  While the NGA fought to retain the Guard, they were 
essentially proposing another alternative to the old militia system.  The NGA and its 
Congressional allies, such as Charles Dick, proposed creating a state force with federal 
oversight.
44
  Instead of the militia acting independently of the federal government, with 
federalization based on volunteerism, the federal government could activate the National 
Guard in the event of national emergencies.
45
  However, the question of how to achieve this 
was not easily answered.   
The Dick Acts of 1903 and 1908 (amendments to the original act were enacted in 
1908) were the initial Congressional answers to the militia question.  These Acts not only 
increased federal funding to the Guard and created a set of standards for all Guard units; they 
also defined a new role for the militia.  The National Guard now made up the “organized 
militia,” while all other men between the ages of 18 and 45 would compose the “unorganized 
militia,” both of which could be activated in the event of emergencies.46 This not only 
                                                          
43
 Hill, Minute Man, 214-215.  Essentially, opponents argued that the Guard played no role in the Mexican, 
Civil, and Spanish wars.  While this was technically true (state volunteers were part of the federal army), state 
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redefined the American militia system, but also raised Constitutional questions.
47
  The 
problems associated with the Dick Acts allowed opponents of the Guard to continue their 
opposition.
48
  Therefore, the NGA and Congress continued their efforts of solidifying and 
reforming the newly created Guard System, and these efforts culminated in the National 
Defense Act of 1916.
49
   
In June, 1916, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916, which allowed the 
regular army to double its size to over 200,000 men, and the National Guard to increase its 
strength to 17,000 officers and upwards of 400,000 men.
50
  This law redefined the parameters 
of which the National Guard could be federalized, and placed the Guard firmly within the 
American military system.
51
  Yet, even this third attempt at Guard reform legislation came 
under scrutiny.  Legal reviewers such as B.M. Chiperfield believed the National Guard under 
the new law to be, “most indefinite and uncertain and but little improved over what it was 
before the passage of that bill.”52  Chiperfield further listed constitutional discrepancies of the 
law, specifically in regard to the federalization without state approval, but detractors had 
little time to voice their concerns over the new law. 
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President Wilson activated the National Guards of every state for Mexican border 
service less than a month after passage of the 1916 law.  The National Guard’s role in the 
defense of the nation was somewhat blurred in 1916 and 1917, so too was its role in domestic 
affairs.  Prior to American entry into World War I, working class Americans as well as 
business leaders viewed the National Guard as a tool of corporate interests.  The primary role 
the Guard played at the turn of the twentieth century led to this perception.
53
  Between the 
Gilded Age and the Mexican Border duty, the Guard was often used to break up labor strikes 
and riots. 
For example, in 1894 state governors responded to a massive coal miner strike by 
mobilizing guardsmen from eight states, including Iowa and Illinois.  During that same year, 
guardsmen from twelve states responded to the Pullman Railroad strike, when officers 
ordered guardsmen to fire into rioting crowds in a few instance.
54
  In fact, the Illinois 
National Guard performed strike duty more than any other state’s National Guard due to 
Chicago’s volatile labor situation and close ties to the railroad industry.55  Numerous similar 
cases from the pre-World War I era reflected the inclination of politicians and businessmen 
to mobilize the Guard on the side of capital interests, which created hostility between labor 
unions and the National Guard as an organization.  In 1910, Colonel E.M. Weaver, head of 
the Division of Militia to the Chief of Staff, stated, “The hostile attitude of labor unions 
towards the organized militia has created a very pessimistic feeling among officers of the 
army and the National Guard.”56  Unions came to view the Guard as an enemy to their 
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cause.
57
  This hostility greatly hurt morale within the Guard, as many troops came from the 
same communities and social class as the laborers they were mobilized against.
58
  When 
border duty came, the newly created Guard system faced many unresolved issues, and its 
place in the American system was not a foregone conclusion. 
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Mexican Border Service 
After years of strained relations between the United States and Mexico, violence 
eventually broke out.  In March, 1916 Francisco “Pancho” Villa raided the 13th U.S. Cavalry 
camp near Columbus, New Mexico with nearly 250 men.  Villa caught the troops completely 
by surprise, but American forces turned the Mexicans away.  During the raid, Villa’s forces 
killed nine civilians and eight U.S. troops and wounded many others and destroyed 
Columbus. President Wilson immediately decided upon retaliation, and ordered a punitive 
expedition to capture Villa.59  Newly appointed Secretary of War, Newton Baker, 
recommended Brigadier General John “Black Jack” Pershing to lead the expedition, and 
Baker ordered Major General Frederick Funston to create a force large enough to facilitate 
the capture of Villa and the destruction of the band that raided Columbus.  President Wilson 
and the War Department clearly stated to Mexico and the military that the mission was to 
capture Villa and not to attack the Mexican government.
60
  This expedition proved a massive 
failure. 
Failures of the expedition stemmed from various reasons.  For one, most of the U.S. 
Army was stationed in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal Zone.  National Guard 
units (not part of the expedition) of various strengths and levels of readiness made up the 
bulk of land forces within the United States.  Therefore, most of the troops who went on the 
expedition were members of the cavalry from around the country, and though they 
encountered little resistance they also received no help from the local populace.  More often 
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than not, the expedition would arrive at a small town only to realize that the Villistas had left 
days earlier.
61
  No decisive battle ever occurred, and more importantly, Villa was never 
captured.  The lack of an adequate expeditionary force hindered the punitive expeditions 
progress. 
Unpreparedness was another major setback of the expedition.  For the first time in 
American history, the army utilized new technologies such as airplanes and motor vehicles, 
including trucks, motorcycles, and tanks.
62
  Unfortunately for the soldiers though, the new 
equipment was untested and unproven.  Logistics simply broke down.  The Army proved it 
was unready to handle issues of supply, communication, and transportation.
63
  The 
expedition embarrassed the Army, but more importantly did not succeed in capturing Villa, 
and the border remained unsecured.  President Wilson needed to do something, and he opted 
to use the National Guard as a defensive force between the United States and Mexico. 
For many guardsmen, service at the Mexican border provided a welcome change 
from strike duty.  Therefore, the troops of Illinois and Iowa were generally happy to be called 
into service.
64
  Many troops hoped to answer the nation’s call to arms, as they considered 
themselves descendants of the minutemen of the American Revolution.
65
  When war fever 
struck, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported, “[at] All of the armories of the Illinois National 
Guard, the scenes of such bustle and activity has not been witnessed within them since the 
Spanish American War,” the headline of that same article was, “‘On to Mexico’ Spirit 
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Sweeps Over Chicago: Recruiting Stations Swamped and Militia Armories Crowded by 
Eager Civilians.”66  One such soldier was Irving Goff McCann.  McCann served as a 
chaplain with the First Illinois Infantry Brigade of Chicago during the border service and was 
promoted from to the rank of captain to major prior to wartime service.  McCann’s memoir 
of his service in Texas, With the National Guard on the Border: Our National Military 
Problem, detailed the First’s (as well as the greater Guard’s) service at the border, and 
outlined many weaknesses the Guard faced prior to border service.  McCann wrote of a 
hypothetical conversation with a civilian, stating that if a National Guardsman was asked 
about Mexico, the trooper would reply with a grin, “There is no such thing as being too 
proud to fight.”67  According to McCann, guardsmen were willing to put former hostilities 
and struggles aside in exchange for carrying their flag into battle.   
Troops began arriving at the border on June 30, 1916 eager to go to war, but border 
duty did not meet their expectations.  While the war in Europe was on the minds of many 
Americans, the troops of the National Guard had been mobilized to fight a “war” with 
Mexico, and numerous troops hoped to “follow Old Glory into battle.”68  Also, many 
prominent civilians, Guard officers, and members of Congress favored intervention in 
Mexico to restore order.
69
  Of course, the troops did not know what was in store for them, 
and service at the border provided the troops with valuable training needed to succeed in 
future operations.  General Funston laid out the overall mission of the Guard by declaring 
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that coast to coast patrols would commence upon arrival.
70
  These patrols stretched from the 
Pacific in California to the Gulf of Mexico in Texas, but the troops needed to establish camps 
first.   
When the troops arrived at their respective base camps, they proceeded to dig their 
latrines, set up their pup tents, secure the perimeter, and build mess areas.  However, due to 
the new legal status of the Guard as a federalized force, the federal government helped with 
the construction.  When the Illinois troops arrived, they found the government constructing 
bathhouses and making a water connection to a nearby town.
71
  The officers who slept in 
larger private tents had cots to sleep on, while the ordinary soldier used a bed and blanket roll 
and slept on the ground.
72
  While all these provisions were made, some troops were in Texas 
nearly a month before receiving a government issued blanket.  There simply were not enough 
to go around to the huge amount of troops at the border, and cots, tents, and pistols were a 
hard commodity to come by due to shortages.
73
  This again demonstrated the U.S. 
government’s level of unpreparedness as World War I approached. 
Overall, border duty was a massive, long term training mission.  The troops drilled 
for nearly a month prior to their first long-distance patrols.  Part of this daily drilling 
consisted of short hikes which lasted roughly two hours, and were carried out in hard 
marching order, which meant the troops had full backpacks, a nine-pound Springfield rifle, a 
fixed bayonet, and all of their other equipment.
74
  The intention of these marches was to 
condition the troops to the heat as well as the longer hikes ahead.  The First Illinois embarked 
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on their first long march on July 24, 1916, and it was about twenty-five miles in length from 
San Antonio to Leon Springs, Texas.  The intense heat immediately took its toll, and troops 
began falling out of the march in droves.  Some regiments had as many as 250 men fall out, 
which caused ambulances to clog the streets, and the poor performance of the Illinois troops 
on this first march broke the spirits of many troopers and left the brigade in a state of 
embarrassment.
75
  However, there was a positive outcome of the disastrous first march.  If 
anything, it served as motivation for the men of the First Illinois as well as other states’ units 
to improve.  The Milwaukee Journal reported, “Longer and faster hikes were taken by all 3 
Wisconsin regiments today.  The poor showing of the Illinois troops in their first day’s hike 
Monday, July 24
th, has aroused the Wisconsin officers and enlisted men to greater effort.”76   
 The marches continued, and gradually grew in length.  The first march consisted of 
two days of roughly fourteen miles.  Eventually a day’s march could be as long as seventeen 
or eighteen miles.  Captain McCann declared the men “hard as rocks” after only three months 
at the border.
77
  The culmination of these marches took place in mid-September, 1916, when 
14,000 troops from Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas, Texas, and Missouri embarked on a fifteen 
day, 166-mile march from San Antonio to New Braunfels, Texas.  Even though the weather 
shifted from intense heat to hurricane-like conditions, the troops moved forward.  Colonel 
Moses Thisted of the Third Wisconsin wrote, “The march also demonstrates how skillfully 
these civilians were transposed into an army of fighting men after a preparation of only 2 ½ 
months,” and that “another outstanding feature of this great March was the splendid manner 
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in which the Supply Trains have been kept moving day and night.”78  One initial failure of 
the Punitive Expedition had been rectified, and the Guard was proving its ability to adapt and 
prepare. 
 Weapons training was another important aspect of the border duty, and consisted of 
bayonet training, pistol training, and “fire distribution” practice.  This aspect of training fit 
well into a long-standing Guard tradition.  When the Guard replaced pageantry with 
efficiency near the end of the nineteenth century, marksmanship competitions provided a 
way for a trooper to prove his worth and establish his place within his unit.
79
  Indeed, after 
reorganization, many Guard units were comparable to regular troops in marksmanship 
drills.
80
  Also, the National Guard leadership decided to combine the marches with weapons 
training.  Rather than riding to places such as Leon Springs (a rifle and pistol range), the 
troops marched two days to the range and two days back to camp after completion.
81
  After 
the roughly twenty five mile march the troops would spend anywhere from two to ten days at 
the range.  This training familiarized the troops at the border with their rifles, pistols, and 
machine guns, and the troopers became well trained and adept at weapon drills.  
 Another staple of the border duty were simulated battles.  Some of these battles 
became competitions between companies, giving the victorious company bragging rights, 
which again tied to a sense of masculinity among the troops.  Often, hidden targets were set 
up in certain areas, and as a company advanced the officer in charge would signal someone 
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down range to open the targets, and the companies engaged the targets as they would a 
human enemy.  The company with the best score and fire distribution won.
82
  Other types of 
simulated battles added a human element to both sides.  Two companies or brigades would 
engage each other, with one company in the defense and the other on the offense.  A large 
scale simulation took place during the longest march of the year.  When one general took 
14,000 troops to New Braunfels, another general utilized 4,000 of the troops to defend New 
Braunfels.  Upon completion, over 80,000 rounds of blank ammunition had been fired, and 
the Milwaukee Journal reported the battle to be a “magnificent spectacle.”83  While they 
were training for defense against Mexican incursions, a battle with over 14,000 troops 
engaged was much larger than anything the Mexicans could muster.  These movements 
prepared the Guardsmen at the border for large scale, defensive and offensive engagements.  
The Army was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Punitive Expedition, and the 
border situation provided the Army with a large training arena.  
  Camp life outside of drilling also prepared the troops for an important element of 
wartime service.  Insects and bugs such as chiggers, scorpions, ticks, and tarantulas pestered 
the troops continuously.  Irving McCann remembered hearing sounds of scratching within 
the pup tents after taps (no talking was allowed after taps played).  He also joked that, “I once 
had half of the jiggers in Mexico on me at one time.”   McCann further wrote that brushing 
against a tree or resting in by a bush could “gather you a crop of ticks.”84  Further, the lack of 
action created a sense of boredom within the camps.  In response to a letter, Illinois Senator 
Lawrence Sherman wrote, “My friends, Walter A. Ronenfield, R.R. McCormick, and Col. 
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Milton J. Foreman of the First Illinois Cavalry are stationed at or near your place.  If you 
could call around sometime it might break the monotony of their camp life for them to know 
one of their friends is in that part of the country.”85  While it may have seemed 
uncomfortable and dull, this too provided the troops with valuable experience because camp 
life on the border was filled with many of the same irritations of life in Europe.  Many 
guardsmen found life in the trenches filled with the same insects and filth associated with the 
border, and other guardsmen experienced the same kind of monotony at home-front camps 
and reserve lines during the war.
86
 
The troops returned from the border in increments.  Some units, such as the First 
Illinois returned to Chicago after only 3 months at the border out of fear of labor disputes in 
Chicago, though this was not a typical case.  As 1917 began, all but one of Iowa’s Guard 
Units remained federalized at the border.
87
  However, by March, 1917 President Wilson had 
halted General Pershing’s push into Mexico and American entry into World War I seemed 
imminent.
88
  Therefore, all of the Iowa and Illinois troops had returned home, but pre-border 
perceptions of the Guard proved difficult to reverse.  While the troops who returned from the 
border were certainly prepared for war, their negative public image remained, and the poor 
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public image of National Guard grew to such proportions that when America entered the war, 
the Guard’s ability to recruit the necessary number of men seemed in doubt.89   
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Recruitment and Wartime Mobilization 
In order to reach wartime strength, the federal government required Guard units to 
raise the numbers of each company to 100 men, and a state’s population determined its 
overall numbers.  For instance, the federal government required Iowa to supply roughly 
10,000 guardsmen to aid the war effort.   But given the Guard’s negative image as 
strikebreakers, relatively few working-class men were willing to volunteer for service.
90
  As 
a sign of national unity and patriotic duty, the Executive Board of the Iowa State Federation 
of Labor sent a circular letter to 40,000 union members in 1917 urging them to answer the 
call to arms.  This plea noted that the Iowa National Guard was “the only organization which 
will carry the name of our state into the conflict,” and added: 
There is no good reason why union men should not answer their country’s call and 
join the National Guard, and every reason why they should.  Let all ill feeling, 
sentiment or opposition be swept aside in this hour of our country’s crisis.  Trade 
unionists do and will stand shoulder to shoulder with other defenders of this 
republic’s liberty, regardless of class or calling.91 
The Iowa state-government also helped encourage recruitment by pressing major employers 
to publicly pledge that workers who enlisted in the National Guard during the war would 
regain their positions when they returned home.
92
 
While unions seemed at least willing to put some hostility aside during the war to 
ensure national unity, confusion about the Guard’s role in the American Army continued.  
Confusion over federal oaths of service epitomized the lack of clarity in regard to the role of 
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the federalized Guard.  The National Defense Act of 1916 allowed the president to call the 
National Guard into federal service for any national emergency; however, due to the state-
controlled nature of the Guard, guardsmen had to take a separate oath of service that placed 
them under federal jurisdiction.
93
  The nature of the Guard under the new system meant the 
Guard was a state force until federalized in events of national emergencies; therefore, all 
Guardsmen took an oath to their state upon enlistment, but were required to take a federal 
oath if mobilized.
94
  Further, when the Mexican conflict ended and guardsmen returned from 
the border, they were technically mustered out of Federal service.  However, the National 
Guard was denied the role of “active service” during the border crisis and was once again 
asked to take another oath of federal service upon the American declaration of war.  Many 
guardsmen simply did not understand this new law and responded with much hostility to the 
insistence that they take another federal oath.
95
   
More contention during World War I also arose from a deeper confusion over the role 
of the Guard in federal service.  The law of 1916 established that the U.S. Army would 
consist of the “Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Enlisted 
Reserve Corps, and the National Guard.” 96  This not only established the Guard as part of 
the U.S. Army, but it also meant that guardsmen would fall under the same laws and 
regulations of the regular army when they were in federal service.
97
  Once again, many 
guardsmen opposed this new role in which they found themselves, with some even risking 
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court-martial.
98
  This opposition to the regular army stemmed from the traditional nature of 
Guard service being separate from the federal government, but the new National Guard 
system required the integration of the Guard and the army.   
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The Guard in the Great War 
 Only months after the completion of border duty, the Guard began the new system of 
army integration.  After nearly three years of American neutrality, the United States declared 
war on Germany and its allies on April 6, 1917.
  
 While the war had been raging in Europe 
since August 1914, the United States was still largely unprepared for a large scale war.  Not 
only did the American government need to mobilize its existing troops for war, but the 
government estimated an additional 800,000 men were needed to meet the needs of the 
Western Front.
99
  Accordingly, Woodrow Wilson and Congress decided to utilize 
conscription, based on the experiences of the British and French.  The Selective Service Act, 
passed in April, 1917, created over 4,600 local draft boards.  These boards were not made up 
of military personnel, but rather consisted of influential local citizens.
100
  The drafted force 
came to be known as the “National Army” and was only one component of the larger 
American Army.
101
  By doing this, the United States had implemented its first modern draft; 
however, training a large, conscripted force was a long and arduous process.
102
 
 Conscripted troops did not make up most of the AEF.  Volunteerism was still a 
leading factor in raising the American Army, and nowhere was the spirit of volunteerism 
more prevalent and long-standing than in the National Guard.  On March 25, President 
Wilson recalled into federal service a small number of guardsmen from each state in 
preparation for a possible European war, and by July 15, 1917 all of the National Guard had 
been called into federal service.  Guardsmen reported to their respective duty stations over 
the course of the next two weeks, and on August 5, 1917 the government officially removed 
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the Guard from state control.
103
  Within months of the declaration of war, the National Guard 
had become part of the AEF, and the Guard did a more efficient job of quickly providing 
trained units for service than could the National Army, which struggled to organize and train 
large numbers of raw conscripted men. 
Border duty prepared the troops for service, and ensured their quick mobilization.  
However, not all of the troops who returned from the border remained in the Guard due to 
their refusal to take a second oath of service.  For instance, only 2,200 Iowa troops out of the 
4,300 Iowa Guardsmen who returned from the border agreed to take the oath; yet, these 
troops were more prepared for service than new volunteers and those drafted into service.
104
  
Essentially, the 2,200 troops who remained after the border duty were reorganized and 
moved into the 3
rd
 Iowa Infantry, which was renamed the 168
th
 U.S. Infantry and became 
part of the 42
nd
 Infantry Division (or the Rainbow Division, made up primarily of Guardsmen 
from across the nation who returned from the border), which was one of the first divisions to 
arrive in France.
105
  The 168
th
 was mobilized in April of 1917, and by mid-October, the unit 
had received orders to go “over there.”106  Because the guardsmen were already trained, the 
Rainbow Division was able to arrive in France along with the first regular army troops.  
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A small number of guardsmen who continued serving after the Mexican border 
conflict and were not transferred to the Rainbow Division provided valuable guidance for the 
new recruits just joining the guard.  These units with untrained recruits required more time 
for preparation, and the military assigned them to extended duty at the home front.  For 
instance, the first battalion of Iowa’s Field Artillery was sent to Fort Roots near Little Rock, 
Arkansas and later to Camp Cody, New Mexico.  The field artillery was later joined at Camp 
Cody by the rest of the newly organized Iowa Guard units as part of the 34
th
 Infantry 
Division.
107
  The Illinois Guard not included in the Rainbow Division formed the 33
rd
 
Infantry Division and moved to Camp Logan near Houston, Texas for advanced training.
108
  
Many of these troops did not receive overseas orders for nearly another year.  While this 
experience was similar to that of conscripted troops, it was also shared by new volunteers of 
the regular army.  Therefore, guardsmen who did not participate in the border duty were as 
prepared for overseas duty as new volunteers. 
After a long journey, the troops finally arrived in Europe, but did not head 
immediately to the front lines.  The first stop was a short layover in England, where the men 
underwent further drills.  American troops received a welcome and motivational letter from 
King George V, who offered his support and thanks to the American soldiers.
109
  Many men 
enjoyed their brief time in England, such as Iowa guardsman August Smidt who remarked in 
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a letter to his girlfriend that his stay was in a “very good place, also good mess, but I think 
we will be leaving here before very long, but this is sure a beautiful country.”110 
Upon leaving England for France, guardsmen spent more time drilling and training 
for the front.  For instance, the 168
th
 Infantry arrived at La Havre on December 9, 1917 and 
moved to a rest camp, which Cecil Clark described as a “Hell hole.”111  Two days later, the 
troops moved out at dawn for Rimencourt, when they had the pleasure of passing Versailles.  
The troops stayed in Rimencourt for over a month, where they spent their time drilling and 
undergoing inspections.  Finally, on February 1, 1918, after nearly two months in France, the 
troops of the 168
th
 hiked toward the front lines.  Throughout February these troops spent their 
days maneuvering, hiking, and parading through the streets of France for official reviews.  
However, the lives of these troops changed forever in March.  Cecil Clark noted in his diary 
that the Germans raided two sister companies on March 5.  He further noted that Company M 
along with two French companies went “over the top” on March 11, where an Iowa corporal 
was killed.  The next week was filled with German artillery barrages, and on the March 17 
Clark’s company made their first raid against the German lines.112 
Sergeant Charles Kosek was also in the trenches during the first weeks of March, 
1918, and his highly personalized diary entries noted the strains and emotions of wartime.  
Kosek perceived a level of hypocrisy on the part of commanders.  According to Kosek, a 
company of the 168
th
 had been awarded war crosses even though they were a mile in the rear 
of the trenches.  Conversely, “We ran out and repulsed the Hun attack as soon as the barrage 
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lifted; we got nothing.  B Co. waited till they were sure it was all over and when they came 
out the Huns were in their trench and they had to run them out, result they got three 
medals.”113  While this account probably contains levels of truth, it is also partial and B 
Company troops likely maintained a different opinion.  Private Alfred Bowen stated in a 
letter, “You really cannot believe anything you hear in the army, as you hear all kinds of 
conflicting rumors.”114 
World War I served as an eye-opening experience for Guard troops, because 
guardsmen never saw actual combat at the border.  The realities of trench warfare and 
modern weaponry created devastation, destruction, and pain foreign to most young troopers, 
but border duty lessened the learning curve, as guardsmen already held the basic skills 
necessary for combat.  Further, the war changed the way many saw warfare, erasing what 
many admired in retrospect as the old spirit and glory of war.  Indeed, Marinetti’s call to 
glorify war was put to the test.  Life in the trenches, which consisted of constant shelling, 
machine gun fire, mortar attacks, air and tank warfare, and the painful reality of gas warfare 
replaced pre-war ideas of heroism.  As Paul Fussell argues, “Every war is ironic because 
every war is worse than expected.”115  The Guard troops, particularly those in the Rainbow 
Division, soon faced this reality in daily combat actions, but they were extensively trained for 
combat operations. 
Of the new weaponry of the First World War, perhaps none was as devastating as the 
effects of poisonous gas on the soldiers in the trenches.  Soldiers had some protection, 
                                                          
113
 John Kosek, editor,  The Iowa Boys: A Remembrance of a Killing Contest, The Diary and Letters of Sergeant 
Charles Kosek Company D, 168
th
 Iowa Infantry, 42
nd
 Rainbow Division, American Expeditionary Force France, 
1917-1918 (Copyright, Las Vegas NV 2010: Iowa National Guard Archives) 13. 
114
 Alfred Bowen, Letter to Alice Woolston, July 10, 1917, Papers of Alfred Bowen, 2000.48.4, Iowa National 
Guard Archives, Camp Dodge, IA (Johnston, IA). 
115
 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) 7. 
35 
 
including gas masks, which they tested in specially designed chambers to the rear of the 
trenches.
116
  But even gas masks could not ensure safety; Iowa Guardsman Lloyd Ross, who 
was a Captain during World War I in the 168
th
 and a veteran of the Spanish-American War, 
noted on one occasion that after seeing gas pouring into his trench, he gave the call of “gas” 
to warn others before putting on his mask.  The result was incredibly painful. 
I could feel the gas burning my throat and lungs and then I knew that I didn’t get my 
mask on in time and that I was gassed.  I stood my post for a few minute and then I 
began to get dizzy and couldn’t stand up anymore.  Corporal Kelly took me to my 
bunk and tole me not to move around.  The next morning I was taken to the hospital 
where I found several of my pals who were gassed the same night.
117  
Francis Webster, who was also a member of the 168
th
 Infantry, noted in a letter to his 
parents, that he had also been gassed and was recuperating in a hospital.
118
   
 While the Guard troops of the 42
nd
 Division saw extensive combat in Europe, much 
of the National Guard did not share this experience.  The Rainbow Division saw action in 
every major U.S. engagement of the war, and it included Guard troops and officers from 26 
total states and included many distinguished officers such as then Colonel Douglas 
MacArthur.
119
  However, most guardsmen involved in combat operations did not arrive in 
France until the middle of 1918; yet, seven of the eleven divisions poised for an American 
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advance in August were Guard divisions.
120
  Other Guard divisions, such as the 34
th
 
(containing Iowa’s Guard) were not sent directly to the front, but did see some combat as 
reserve organizations.
121
  Unlike the wartime experience of troops in the Rainbow Division, 
monotony exemplified life at the camps and away from the front lines, and border duty 
familiarized officers and troops with the monotonous lifestyle associated with camp life away 
from the front lines.    
The monotony of camp life is apparent in the official history of the 126
th
 Field 
Artillery (formerly the First Iowa Field Artillery).  The 126
th
 arrived at Fort Roots, Arkansas 
early in July 1917 and left for Camp Cody, New Mexico in October 1917.  The official 
history then noted months on end which consisted of “usual camp duties.”122  The 126th 
remained at Camp Cody until July 1918, when they embarked for training at Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma, which continued for three months.  The 126
th
 arrived in France on October 18, 
1918 where they once again “took up usual camp duties.”123  The monotony of usual camp 
duties was seemingly only interrupted for transportation to other stations, training of a 
specific nature, and official reviews of the 34
th
 Division.
124
  The experience of these Iowa 
troops was drastically different than those of the 168
th
 who were actively engaged in combat; 
however, their service was still important to the war effort because these troops provided the 
regular army with the reserve force necessary to carry out combat operations. 
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While the Guard served an important role in the war effort, political tensions and 
internal struggles continued.  A series of telegrams and letters between Iowa Governor 
William Harding and U.S. Senator Albert B. Cummins (Iowa) show those men’s anger when 
the military decided to break up Iowa units stationed at Camp Cody.  In order to keep the 
camp at its strength of 5,500 men, some Iowa guardsmen were sent overseas with other units, 
while their officers remained in New Mexico to train the new arrivals.
125
 The Guard used 
community connections as a recruitment tool, and this separation of units angered many 
guardsmen because the Guard generally resented military policies which broke down local 
and unit connections.
126
     
Another prime example of political tension relates to the 33
rd
 Division of Illinois 
troops.  In October 1917, the Illinois troops at Camp Logan, Texas and the 32
nd
 Division of 
Wisconsin and Michigan troops (stationed at Camp MacArthur, Texas) were preparing for 
combat operations in Europe.  However, shakedowns and inspections proved that the 
Wisconsin and Michigan troops were at a higher state of readiness than the Illinois troops 
(though this was mostly due to the fact that the Illinois troops recently received a large 
contingent of “unfit” draftees from around Illinois), which postponed the Illinois troops’ 
deployment.
127
  Ultimately, the Army forced the Illinois unit to provide its ordinance and 
various wartime supplies to the Wisconsin and Michigan troops, who were given priority 
over the Illinoisans.  Illinois officers objected to this transfer of supplies, but to no avail, and 
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the loss of ordinance delayed the Illinois deployment even further.
128
  The examples of the 
Illinois troops at Camp Logan and the Iowa troops at Camp Cody demonstrate the Guard’s 
inability to establish political dominance over the regular army.   
As noted earlier, the role of the Guard in the larger American Army was not entirely 
clear.  Prior to the war, military and government leaders seem to have expected that the 
Guard would serve primarily as a reserve force for the Regular Army.  An official report in 
1919 noted that the National Guard “…fulfilled, during the Worlds War, the expectations 
that it would accomplish what was claimed for it, i. e. that with the Regular army it would 
furnish sufficient first line troops to successfully engage the enemy until any larger force 
necessary could be reached and trained.”129  In the case of Iowa and Illinois, the Rainbow 
Division served this first line role, while the other troops who had been called into federal 
service maintained the role of a reserve force. 
Whether on the front lines or the home front, Guard mobilization left the states 
without a local military force.  In order to fill this void, Iowa created one regiment of infantry 
for state duty.
130
  This regiment served the role the Guard had served prior to their 
deployment overseas, which was to quell any labor disputes, put down riots, and aid in 
recovery efforts after disasters.  But the wartime shortage of supplies plagued even this 
temporary unit.  In July 1918, a company of guardsmen from Sioux City, Iowa aided in 
disaster relief after the collapse of the Oscar Ruff Building, even though the men had not yet 
been supplied rifles.  Locals worried that the lack of supplies might limit the guard’s ability 
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to maintain order, especially during harvest season, when a large “floating population” 
passed through Sioux City to harvest fields.
131
 
The service of the National Guard during World War I came in many forms.  For 
some, combat and life in the trenches was a reality.  For others, most of the war was spent 
drilling on the home front or filling roles as reserve troops.  And for others, such as Company 
D of Sioux City, wartime service was related to home state service.  Yet, the service of the 
Guard as a whole played an important role in the war effort, as each piece of the Guard 
played a role in the successful execution of the Army’s mission.  At a time when the role of 
the Guard was still in question, the three roles played by the Illinois and Iowa Guards helped 
to solidify the Guard’s place in the American military. However, at the conclusion of 
hostilities, uncertainty returned about the role for the National Guard in peacetime, and 
indeed, questions about whether it could continue to exist. 
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Return from Europe and Post-war Reorganization 
 Debate surrounding the continued existence of the Guard reemerged when World 
War I ended.  As previously noted, the National Defense Act of 1916 created confusion 
among the ranks of guardsmen, particularly dealing with federal oaths.  A ruling by the Judge 
Advocate General of the Army declared that guardsmen who had taken a federal oath of 
service and were subsequently discharged from federal service were also discharged from 
any previous commitment or enlistment.
132
  However, there was little malicious intent from 
the federal government.  Essentially, any guardsman who had taken the oath of federal 
service was discharged from the U.S. Army upon his return from Europe, and that discharge 
translated into a discharge from all military obligations: state and federal.   For Iowa and 
Illinois, this meant the only remaining state troops were those in the regiments created after 
initial federalization, as well as those who had enlisted after the mobilization of the Guard.
133
  
This massive discharge had a devastating effect on the National Guard system as a whole. 
This sudden hollowing-out of the entire National Guard dismayed American 
governors, who worried that their states would need a strong post-war Guard force to 
continue their previous peacetime duties on strike and riot duty.  For instance, in April 1919, 
the Iowa government placed the state National Guard on alert in anticipation of any potential 
trouble at the International Workers of the World convention to be held in Des Moines.
134
 At 
the same time, the pre-war negative image of the National Guard as anti-labor strikebreakers 
placed the future recruitment and survival of the Guard in jeopardy.  Even the Guard’s 
                                                          
132
 Hill, Minute Man, 208. 
133
 Lasher, Report, 1920, 1. And Hill, Minute Man, 298-9. 
134
 Sheriff W.H. Jones, Letter to Governor Harding, April 18, 1919, Correspondence of Governor Harding, Box 
19, Iowa Historical Society (Des Moines, IA).  In this letter, Sheriff Jones asked the Governor on behalf of 
himself and the Des Moines mayor if the National Guard could be placed on alert for the I.W.W. Convention in 
late April. 
41 
 
extensive service during World War I did not automatically remove earlier tensions with 
working-class citizens.  In one 1919 letter the Militia Bureau wrote that the Guard’s mission 
should not be “for the purpose of aiding capital in its issues with labor but with a view to 
enforcing the law of the land and of preserving local communities from a reputation for 
lawlessness.”  The Bureau worried that members’ “dislike of strike duty” and the “hostility 
of labor unions toward the National Guard” had contributed to low morale among Guard 
members.
135
  Pre-war and pre-border duty perceptions of the Guard proved difficult to erase, 
and some Guard opponents still supported replacing the Guard with some sort of UMT.
136
  
However, the Guard’s service in the war demonstrated that the new Guard system was 
effective.   
Accordingly, state governors and legislators lobbied Washington to strengthen the 
National Guard system, to insure its continued existence, to raise members’ morale, and to 
improve recruitment.  The NGA maintained a strong lobby in Washington throughout the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, and their efforts grew in strength after the First 
World War.
137
  While the Guard itself pushed for more reform, regular army officers who 
worked closely with the Guard, such as Douglas MacArthur and General Pershing himself, 
praised the Guard’s service in Europe.138  General Pershing even declared that the National 
Guard never received full support from the federal government during the war.
139
  While 
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Pershing and MacArthur viewed the Guard favorably, the Army General Staff and officers 
who did not serve alongside guardsmen never viewed the Guard as true equals due to its role 
as both a state and federal force.  Many in the General Staff favored UMT prior to American 
entry into the war, and they carried this opinion with them throughout the war.
140
  However, 
the Guard’s records as both combat troops and reservists provided the Guard with the 
political ammunition it needed to lobby senators and representatives.       
Congress complied, and by June, 1920 they amended the National Defense Act to 
strengthen the new National Guard system.  The federal government established new peace-
time and wartime standards for the proper size of Guard units, with a minimum strength of 
fifty men and an operating strength of sixty five.  The most important provision stated that 
troops who had served during World War I and were discharged before their original 
commitments expired, could re-enlist in the Guard for one year periods.  This allowed 
guardsmen to return to the Guard, but they were not forced to re-enlist in typical three year 
increments, unless they wished to.  Finally, the new law declared that guardsmen who had 
been drafted into federal service, then discharged when the emergency ended, would have to 
finish their term with the National Guard.
141
 
The legislation of the National Defense Act amendments of 1920 ensured that the 
Guard would not disintegrate when massive deployments ended, while also creating a 
peacetime reorganization of the Guard as a whole.  A corps system replaced the Army 
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divisional system of World War I, with the National Guard providing eighteen divisions of 
infantry and two divisions of cavalry for the new Army corps.
142
  Military leaders aimed to 
ensure that the nation would have a fighting force of two million men by 1924, and their 
quota stipulated that each state provide a certain number of troops based on its population.
143
  
For instance, the Iowa was to provide more than 10,000 men to meet this goal, and the 
National Guards of Iowa, Minnesota, North, and South Dakota would compose one infantry 
division.
144
  Similarly, the Illinois Guard made up another infantry division, and by 1920, the 
American military system officially included the National Guard for the long term.   
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Conclusion 
 The future of the National Guard was in serious jeopardy at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  Years of congressional debate created three pieces of legislation designed to 
integrate the unorganized state militias into the American military system.  The militia 
system, which had existed in America even prior to independence, had been replaced with a 
National Guard system which allowed for guardsmen to be federalized for service whenever 
deemed necessary by the President or Congress.  The Dick Acts of 1903 and 1908 replaced 
the old militia system with the modern National Guard system, and the National Defense Act 
of 1916 established the Guard as a key component of the American military.  However, the 
new National Guard needed to prove itself capable of serving in a modern military system.  
After years of turmoil between the United States and Mexico, following a failed expedition 
to capture the outlaw Pancho Villa, President Woodrow Wilson called the National Guard to 
protect the border from further incursions.  The troops answered the call; however, they 
never engaged the enemy.  Instead, they spent most of their time training and drilling for 
future actions, but this training proved itself to be of great value, because when war service 
came, the Guard was ready and able to fight.  The National Guard put this training to use in 
France and proved its abilities as a fighting force.   
 National Guard members of numerous states, including Illinois and Iowa were among 
the first American troops to reach the battlefields of Europe.  Guard troops lived and fought 
in the trenches and dealt with the same horrors and hazards associated with modern trench 
warfare as the regular army.  Any notion that Guard troops might be inferior or inadequate 
was quickly dispelled, once their Rainbow Division compiled an impressive service record in 
major military engagements.  Even those guardsmen who did not see combat played a major 
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role in America’s efforts to gain victory on the battlefield, as a valuable reserve force.  The 
World War I period proved the new National Guard system was capable of quick 
mobilization and was indeed an efficient fighting force.  The border duty provided the Guard 
the combat skills necessary to carry out operations in France, and without it, the Guard would 
have needed to undergo the same late train-up as drafted troops.     
As World War I ended, National Guardsmen, including those from Illinois and Iowa, 
were suddenly discharged, meaning that Guard units had almost no men left.  The survival of 
the new National Guard system was again in jeopardy.  During the war the National Guard 
had filled a gap, as they were ready to move overseas and bolster regular Army units, long 
before the military could finish training its new raw conscripts.  Observers appreciated the 
way the Guard had played an essential dual role, both as a front line organization and a 
reserve force.  Accordingly, the War Department and Congress took steps to ensure the 
Guard would not disappear.  The Guard system faced opposition from politicians and 
civilians alike after the Spanish-American War, and opponents made efforts to replace the 
existing system with UMT.  The Guard maintained a strong lobby and survived initial 
attempts at replacement, but still needed to prove itself capable of serving as a valuable piece 
of the American Army.  Guardsmen received valuable training at the Mexican border in 1916 
and utilized this training in France during the First World War.  The Guard performed better 
than expected in Europe (both as a front line force and a reserve force), and supporters of the 
Guard took steps to strengthen it after the war.  Officials moved swiftly to reorganize and re-
strengthen the Guard just at a time when it seemed to be collapsing on itself.  Their move 
solidified the new National Guard system and clarified its future role, ensuring that the Guard 
would remain a major part of the American military to this day. 
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